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The Use and Opportunity of Cooperative Organizational Forms as an Innovative  
 
Regulatory Tool Under the Clean Water Act 
 
 
  In debates over environmental policy reform, economists frequently express enthusiasm 
for the use of trading programs to achieve goals under the Clean Water Act.  In the most general 
sense, trading programs allow regulated parties to transfer legal and financial responsibilities to 
another entity who can fulfill these responsibilities in a more cost effective way.  Such trading 
programs are a way to insert financial incentives and flexibility into a command-oriented 
regulatory program.  In water quality policy, economists promote effluent trading programs as a 
way to reallocate a limited number of discharge rights. The Environmental Protection Agency 
(2003, 2004) increasingly echoes the sentiment of economists and has recently released a number 
of policy announcements supporting the development and use of effluent trading programs.    
Similar concepts are applied to the nation’s wetland program.  The Corps of Engineers (1995) 
administers a variety of permitting programs regulating wetland fills.  As part of a national no-
net-loss wetland goal, the Corps allows fill permit applicants to offset wetland losses by 
purchasing wetland enhancement credits (a form of compensatory wetland mitigation) from third 
party commercial wetland bankers.   
  Trading programs designed to achieve environmental goals   reflect the economists’ 
interest in markets and market processes. Yet, Ronald Coase in his seminal 1937 paper “Theory 
of the Firm” argues that the firm can be thought of as an organizational mechanism to avoid or 
lower transaction costs associated with market transactions.  Coase’s general thesis is that firms 
exist because it may be more cost-effective to coordinate some economic activity within the 
confines of a single organization than conducting transactions among multiple, independent 
firms.  A large body of work has since explored and elaborated on the relationship between   2
transaction costs and firm organization and formation (for example the work of Oliver 
Williamson).  Similar reasoning may apply to regulatory policy reform under the Clean Water 
Act. Rather than creating a formal system of exchange between separate regulated entities, new 
organizational forms might be created to internalize the transfer of regulatory responsibilities 
within the confines of a single legal entity. 
  It is argued that new organizational forms that consolidate multiple regulated entities 
under a single organizational umbrella are an overlooked, but potentially useful avenue for 
environmental policy reform.  Such an approach would create new organizational forms that 
coordinate and jointly manage the collective regulatory obligations of a group of regulated 
parties.  In concept, these new organizational forms would function much like a farmer 
cooperative – using coordination and consolidation to lower input costs to its members.  These 
new organizations could take on a number of different forms including structures similar to a 
cooperative, association, or a foundation.  Private and public regulated entities alike could 
benefit from participation in these new organizations.   If properly designed, such cooperative 
organizational forms could provide regulated parties financial incentives and decision-making 
flexibility typically associated with formal, “textbook” trading programs.  
The objective of this paper is to illustrate the efficacy of creating new organizational 
forms as a way to create incentives and flexibility in the effluent control and wetland permitting 
programs.  In each program, the types and origins of barriers to establishing trading mechanisms 
under the water quality and wetland programs are briefly reviewed.  It is argued that the 
particular legal and regulatory structures of each program either prohibits, or imposes significant 
transaction costs to transferring regulatory responsibilities between regulated parties.  The 
sources of these transaction costs in both the wetland and water quality program are somewhat   3
unique and the source of transaction costs under each program will be briefly described.   Case 
study illustrations of how these new organizational forms can lower transaction costs are then 
provided.  
Effluent Control (NPDES Permitting) 
  Trading programs are frequently advanced as a way to introduce flexibility and incentives 
into a command oriented system (Stephenson, Shabman, and Shobe).  At a conceptual level, a 
trading program would authorize decentralize decision-makers to exchange the rights to 
discharge between trading parties.  In the best known trading program in the U.S, the sulfur 
dioxide cap and trade program, a limited number of discharge rights are issued.  The sum of 
these rights, called SO2 allowances, represents a cap on permissible emissions and the rights are 
transferable.  Thus, an allowance trade is a voluntary arrangement to shift SO2 emission rights 
between two willing traders. 
  Such legal transfers of regulatory responsibilities to control waste discharges, however, 
are difficult to achieve and find in the water program. The CWA establishes direct regulatory 
authority over a subset of effluent discharge sources – called point sources.  Point sources, 
historically these included industrial and municipal dischargers, are defined as sources with an 
identifiable point of discharge such as a pipe or ditch.   Federal and state regulatory agencies 
authorize the discharge of effluent into water bodies through the issuance of National Pollution 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. An NPDES permit authorizes the discharge of 
effluent into the waters of the United States based on EPA-identified technology-based effluent 
standards.   
  The legal uncertainties and rigidities of the technology-based effluent standards and the 
NPDES permit process make the transfer of regulatory requirements between regulated (point)   4
sources legally tenuous and risky (Stephenson, Shabman and Geyer 1999).  First, unlike the air 
program, the CWA never explicitly endorses or acknowledges that effluent trading is a legitimate 
water quality management strategy.  Second, once technology-based effluent limits are 
established and written into permits, the Clean Water Act prohibits regulators from “backsliding” 
⎯ issuing less restrictive effluent limits in the future.  The anti-backsliding language creates 
substantial legal risks for a discharger seeking to purchase discharge rights.  Third, reopening 
permits to execute a trade is often perceived to be risky and costly.  For instance, the CWA 
instructs the regulators to routinely revisit and tighten these standards as new pollution control 
technologies become available.  If such behavior occurs, any superior pollution control 
performance intended to generate transferable surplus would be confiscated.  Fourth, NPDES 
permits tend to be prescriptive, frequently specifying the types of effluent control practices that 
must be implemented and maintained.  Such conditions limit discharger’s ability to exercise 
discretion in seeking to lower effluent levels to generate surplus allowances. 
  Given the legal and institutional structure of the CWA, trading programs that transfer 
regulatory effluent control requirements between regulated point sources are rare.  So-called 
“point-nonpoint” trades have been given more attention, but still lack the most basic 
requirements for a market-like program.  Under the CWA, any source not defined as a point 
source and regulated under federal law and is called a nonpoint source. Sources typically 
classified as nonpoint sources include agricultural operations.  Many have observed that the 
marginal effluent control costs to these unregulated sources is substantially less than for 
regulated point sources, thus offering the possibility of cost-reducing trades between point and 
nonpoint sources (REF).  In the context of NPDES permitting, the form of point-nonpoint trading 
that emerges is called an offset program (Stephenson and Shabman 2002).  Offsets arise when   5
regulatory officials apply effluent limitations on point sources that cannot be economically or 
technically achieved.  To remain in compliance, regulatory officials require the point sources to 
finance off-site effluent controls, typically at nonpoint sources. What is important about offsets 
for his paper is that no “trade” or transfer of effluent control responsibility occurs between the 
point and nonpoint sources.   Instead of the nonpoint source assuming new effluent control 
responsibility as the result of selling an offset to a point source, the nonpoint source controls 
become a new regulatory condition in the point source’s NPDES permit.  Thus, the financial and 
legal liability for achieving nonpoint source effluent reductions still rests with the point source.   
Nonpoint offsets are not trades, but rather extensions of the existing NPDES permits.   
Discharger Associations 
Thus, effluent trading programs as economists might recognize the concept have yet to be 
implemented in the CWA.  Yet, many of the advantages that arise from the creation of a market 
for discharge rights could be, and are, being achieved through the creation of discharger 
associations.   Rather than trying to develop ways to transfer regulatory responsibilities between 
individual sources, the concept of a discharger association takes a different approach. A 
discharger association assembles the regulatory responsibilities of many individual dischargers 
and places those regulatory responsibilities under the management of a single new organizational 
entity – a discharger association.  Government regulatory agencies treat the association as a 
single permitted entity and issue a single permit (legal authorization to discharge) to the 
association.  Association members are then free to reallocate responsibility for meeting the 
aggregate regulatory responsibility within the confines of the association.   
The assembling of sources under a single permitted organization greatly reduces the risks 
and costs of shifting effluent control responsibilities between regulated parties.   A discharger   6
association reduces costs and risks of exchange by creating an organizational umbrella in which 
sources can determine how the collective regulatory requirement can be met.  The discharger 
association is analogous to firm’s allocating resources between different enterprises within the 
firm.  Experience with discharger associations under the CWA also indicate that reduced 
regulatory risks and costs have occurred while expanding discharger decision-making flexibility 
and improving pollution prevention incentives.  
Two of the larger scale applications of a compliance association have occurred in the 
Neuse and Tar-Pamlico river basins in North Carolina (Stephenson and Shabman 2002; 
Stephenson, Shabman, and Boyd 2005).   In both programs the state of North Carolina was 
concerned about nutrient enrichment of estuary waters.  The state imposed an aggregate load cap 
on industrial and municipal dischargers equivalent to a 30 percent reduction in nitrogen loads 
from identified baselines.  In both programs, the state granted individual point source dischargers 
a choice: 1) accept new requirements to control nitrogen through individual NPDES permits or 
2) form and join a discharger association.  The rigidities associated with individual NPDES 
permits provided enough incentive for most point source dischargers to opt for the second 
option.  
  North Carolina required the association to meet a single mass load cap.  In the Tar-
Pamlico case, the legal requirement to meet the mass load cap was established by an enforceable 
contractual agreement signed by the association and the state of North Carolina.  In the Neuse 
program, a single “group compliance permit” was issued to the association.  Both legal 
mechanisms established financial penalties for the two associations if aggregate discharges of the 
group exceed the association cap.   All penalties paid by the associations would be used by the 
state of North Carolina to secure offsetting nitrogen reductions from the implementation of   7
nonpoint source controls.  North Carolina established the fee on a per lb (kg) basis and is 
sufficiently large to more than offset any exceedance of the association cap.  Individual NPDES 
permit conditions for nitrogen are issued to all members if the associations refuse to pay any 
required penalties.    
  The two associations are separate legal entities governed by a set of by-laws created by 
the dischargers. The associations are financed by membership dues agreed to and paid for by its 
members. The membership fees are sufficiently large to finance both operation of the association 
and to build a reserve in the event that the association mass load cap is every exceeded. 
Association decisions are conducted through a board of directors selected by the members.   
  A key advantage of the association is similar to that of an formal effluent trading 
program: granting dischargers flexibility to decide how best to meet the aggregate load cap. 
North Carolina grants each association considerable discretion to determine how discharges will 
be controlled and provides a reasonably stable setting for investment in aggressive pollution 
prevention activities.  The state grants the associations broad authority to decide where nitrogen 
control will occur among association members without each member having to enter into a 
formal or lengthy regulatory approval process with the regulatory agency.   The association 
members collectively decide how responsibility for meeting the nitrogen cap will be allocated 
among its members.
1  Thus, the Association achieves the same end as an “open” market for 
discharge rights – a low-cost mechanism for dischargers to reallocate effluent controls to achieve 
a fixed cap.  Moreover, individual dischargers are not required to use specific control practices, 
nor are their operational choices constrained by technology-oriented NPDES permit 
                                                 
1 Interestingly the Tar and Neuse Associations have different internal procedures for this reallocation. In the Tar 
Pamlico association, responsibility for meeting individual effluent targets is an informal agreement among its 
members.   The Neuse Association assigns individual nitrogen allocations to its members and members agree to pay 
additional fees to the association if discharge exceeds their individual allocation.     8
requirements.  Because the legal arrangements between the state and the associations focus on an 
aggregate load cap rather than how the cap is achieved, association members are assured that 
aggressive reductions in discharges will not be penalized by more stringent individual permit 
requirements.  
To date, the associations have performed well.  Both associations have managed to keep 
nitrogen loads considerably below their respective caps.
2  Compliance costs have also fallen 
below original projections.  Further, there is some evidence that the association concept is 
producing incentives for strong cooperative behavior that did not exist prior to implementation.  
Under the association, the financial self-interest of individual dischargers now extends to the 
nitrogen control performance of the other members.  Afterall, negligence or poor performance of 
an association member can have direct financial consequences on the entire membershipo of the 
association.  The association provides a place and organization for members to share expertise 
about nitrogen control (personal communication with Roy Blount and Mike Templeton).  The 
sharing of expertise is particularly valuable for small sewage treatment plants that may lack the 
expertise and resources to exploit operational efficiencies.   
In addition, both the Neuse and Tar associations have been a catalyst to help improve the 
effluent control performance of nonmembers.  In two separate examples, North Carolina 
regulators were confronted with dischargers outside the association who were in constant 
violation of their individual permit requirements.   In response, North Carolina began legal 
proceedings against these dischargers under standard CWA enforcement provisions.  The 
noncompliant dischargers approached the associations for assistance and a request to join. The 
associations agreed to accept these dischargers only under conditions that would allow the 
                                                 
2 The Tar Pamlico Association has existed longer than its Neuse counterpart.  Tar Pamlico association was formed in 
the mid 1990s while the Neuse association formed in the last few years.    9
association to help these dischargers improve effluent control performance (personal 
communication with Roy Blount and Mike Templeton).  While the Neuse association is still 
working out the details with the new member, the Tar-Pamlico association facilitated significant 
improvements in effluent treatment and the once noncompliant discharger is now a solid and 
productive member of the association (personal communication, Roy Blount). 
 
Wetland Permit Program 
National concern over the loss of wetlands led to a national commitment to achieve a no 
net loss of wetland acres and functions. The no net loss goal has become a key focal point for 
structuring the nation’s regulatory programs governing wetland alterations.  The federal permit 
program created by Section 404 of the Clean Water Act is administered by the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers (Corps).  Under 404, anyone wishing to place fill material in an area delineated as a 
wetland and that falls under the legal jurisdiction of Section 404 is required to secure a permit 
from the Corps. If a permit is issued, the permittee is legally and financially required to restore 
degraded wetlands not affected by the fill activity or create new wetlands. The expectation is that 
these “compensation wetlands” will offset the permitted loss of wetlands area and functions and 
thus support the no net loss goal.  These compensation wetland are often called wetland “credits” 
(Shabman and Scodari 2004).  
Historically, regulatory preferences have been given to providing these compensatory 
wetlands as close to the fill site as possible (“on-site”) and as similar to the wetland types lost to 
the fill activity (“in-kind”).  The permittee assumed the responsibility for constructing these on-
site, in-kind compensatory wetlands.  Overtime, however, it became apparent that many of these   10
on-site compensatory wetlands were failing to fully replace lost wetlands (NRC 2001).
3  Now, 
permittees are allowed (under certain circumstances) to secure compensatory mitigation off-site.  
This possibility, in turn, led to the development of private commercial mitigation banks and 
offered the possibility of the development of private competitive markets for wetland credits 
(Shabman, Scodari and King, 1994).  
Private commercial banks develop compensatory mitigation sites independent and away 
from fill activities in order to produce wetland credits for sale to future permittees.  Once the 
wetland credits have been certified (wetland creation determined to be ecologically successful), 
commercial credit suppliers can then sell credits to permittees with compensatory mitigation 
requirements.  Unlike the offset program in water quality program, the purchase of credits by the 
permittee is accompanied with a transfer of legal and financial responsibility to secure the 
compensatory wetland from the permittee to the commercial mitigation banker.  
While commercial banks have expanded considerably in the last decade, the original 
promise of markets of competitive markets wetland credits has gone largely unfulfilled.  A 
variety of regulatory conditions have created barriers to market entry and have created thin 
markets characterized by limited price competition. Although a full discussion of the challenges 
of creating a private wetland credit market is beyond the scope of this paper, many of the barriers 
are a consequence of the costs and uncertainties surrounding the 404 regulatory program.  On the 
supply side, the challenges of certifying credit creation with regulatory officials drive up the cost 
of credit creation.  The demand side is characterized by a variety of uncertainties arising from the 
regulatory program such as:  changing scope of the regulatory jurisdiction of the program, 
changing regulatory preferences for on-site and in-kind mitigation, and limited geographic range 
                                                 
3 In some cases there may simply be inadequate or insufficient sites to construct compensatory wetlands on-site. 
Furthermore, some wetland functions, such as wildlife habitat, may be difficult to achieve on-sites next to developed 
areas (NRC 2001).     11
of acceptable credit trades (for a more detailed discussion see Shabman and Scodari 2004).  
Given this regulatory context, private credit sellers provide only a small fraction of the total 
wetland offsets required by regulators, and credit prices generally appear to be well above credit 
production costs (Shabman and Scodari 2004).       
Cooperative Options: Foundations and Associations 
The costs and uncertainties surrounding the 404 permitting program might create 
opportunities for cooperative-like organizational arrangements to improve both the quality and 
cost-effectiveness of securing compensatory mitigation.  Organizations like a mitigation 
association have been used successfully in the wetland program to provide members with off-site 
compensatory mitigation. In the early 1990s, a group of homebuilders in Ohio sought to create a 
way to meet wetland mitigation requirements under Section 404.  The formation of the 
foundation was motivated by homebuilder concerns about the limited on-site compensatory 
options and uncertainties concerning the availability and price of commercial wetland credits.  
The homebuilders created a nonprofit foundation, the Ohio Wetlands Foundation, for the purpose 
of constructing compensatory mitigation projects.  The Ohio Homebuilders Association provided 
the initial startup funds to the foundation and the Foundation’s Board of Trustees is made up 
primarily of members of the Homebuilders Association.  The Foundation now receives yearly 
income from the sale of wetland credits and sells credits to anyone in need of wetland mitigation 
credits.  As a nonprofit organization, the foundation charges credit prices only sufficient enough 
to cover the full cost their wetland projects.  The Ohio Wetland Foundation is one example of 
how competitors (homebuilders) pooled resources and work cooperatively to satisfy specific 
regulatory requirements at a lower overall cost.    12
Similar concepts are now being investigated as a way for coal companies in the 
Appalachian region to meet new 404 regulatory requirements (Stephenson and Shabman 2004).  
Recently, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE) extended the 404 permitting program to the 
placement of fill from surface mining activities in ephemeral and intermittent streams (streams 
that do not carry water continuously through the year).   Coal companies are now required to 
construct stream restoration and enhancement project to offset effects of the fill on the aquatic 
environment.  A mitigation association would be a legal entity created exclusively to coordinate 
and provide compensatory mitigation for a group of mining companies who are members.  
Various designs of a mitigation association option are being considered as mechanism to provide 
both on-site and off-site compensatory mitigation. 
4 
Currently, most compensatory mitigation is provided by individual companies in the 
immediate vicinity of the fill (on or next to the permitted site).  Opportunities for low cost on-site 
mitigation can sometimes be achieved because the heavy equipment and operator labor skills 
needed for executing a well designed stream restoration and enhancement project are readily 
available.  In fact, low cost aquatic restoration and enhancement opportunities may be so 
abundant in the vicinity of the mining site, surplus mitigation (mitigation in excess of the fill 
activity) could be provided (if allowed by regulators).   
Yet, the opposite may also be true.  The mining site may not offer sufficient amount of 
stream restoration or enhancement opportunities to fully compensate for the total amount of fill 
activities.  The company may have limited experience or access to expertise to design stream 
restoration projects.  The lack of adequate mitigation sites and restoration expertise might be a 
particular problem for medium- to small-size mining operations.  Furthermore, mitigation 
                                                 
4 This effort involves a collaborative dialogue between industry, regulatory officials, and conservation groups and is 
being funded by the Powell River Project.    13
regulations often require long-term maintenance and site protection of an on-site mitigation 
project.  The regulatory or legal prohibitions against future site disturbance of a mitigation site 
may preclude future re-mining operations and further limit on-site mitigation options. 
Thus, the mining industry as a whole may be able to generate sufficient low cost on-site 
mitigation to cover all stream impacts within a given area, but not necessarily at every mining 
site.  The challenge is to take advantage of these individual on-site opportunities whenever they 
occur and then make them available to serve the mitigation needs of the industry as a whole.       
A mitigation association could potentially fill this role.  One role of a mitigation 
association would be to consolidate on-site mitigation credits of its members and then allow 
members to draw on those credits to meet their collective mitigation requirements. For instance, 
suppose mining companies A, B, and C formed a mitigation association. Together companies A, 
B, and C are seeking permits to fill 2,000 feet of intermittent stream.  Member C has few on-site 
compensatory mitigation opportunities, but Members A and B together could construct enough 
on-site compensatory mitigation to completely offset the stream impacts of all three members.  
The association as a whole has generated sufficient compensatory mitigation to cover the total 
stream impacts of members A, B, and C even if all individual members have not.  In such a 
situation, the association would operate to ensure joint compliance with 404 compensatory 
mitigation requirements.  The association members would benefit by being able to take 
advantage of feasible, low cost on-site mitigation options regardless of where they exist, so that 
mitigation compliance costs of all three companies would be reduced.  For this to happen the 
association would adopt procedures where members in need of credits could pay other members 
who have produced credits in excess of their own needs.   14
A mitigation association could also be used to create consolidated mitigation projects that 
are off-site from any of its members. The Association, rather than a commercial credit seller, 
would be responsible for identifying, constructing, and initially paying for these consolidated 
compensatory mitigation projects.  An association of mining companies would be well 
positioned to identify future off-site compensatory mitigation needs because the members would 
know future mining plans and sites.  This knowledge would help reduce some of the demand 
uncertainty surrounding the private banking option.  In planning for off-site mitigation, the 
Association would have strong incentives to identify low costs sites with a high probability of 
achieving ecological success.  Like other mitigation options, a mitigation association would be 
required to provide long-term maintenance requirements and insure that mitigation projects will 
succeed ecologically.  Unlike the private banking option, however, the Association also have 
strong incentives to pass cost savings back to the member mining companies.  The Association 
would pay for the cost of off-site mitigation projects by collecting payments from the members 
who need off-site mitigation credits.  
 
Summary 
  Economists have a long history of promoting and designing trading programs for 
environmental amenities.  Economists believe that the twin aims of introducing incentives and 
decision-making flexibility will improve both environmental and ecological performance of 
regulatory program.  The specific legal and regulatory context in which these programs must be 
grafted, however, can make the transfer of rights in such system costly and legally tenuous.  
Other alternatives, however, exist to achieve similar ends.  As Coase articulated nearly 70 years 
ago, the many productive activities are conducted within the confines of the firm rather than   15
through market transactions because the transaction costs are lower within a single organization.  
This paper illustrates a number of ways in which cooperative organizations of regulated parties 
(new “firms”) can improve regulatory program implementation under the Clean Water Act.  In 
both the water quality and wetland regulatory programs, groups of regulated parties have formed 
new organizational forms that synthesize regulatory requirements under a single organizational 
structure.  The consolidation of regulatory requirements economizes on regulatory costs and 
uncertainties and provides dischargers with new decision-making flexibility to meet these 
requirements.  In advocating and promoting environmental policy reform, economists may be 
able to offer more constructive and realistic policy alternatives if consideration and research into 
policy alternatives was expanded beyond the invisible hand of the market to the visible discretion 
of a “firm”.   
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